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Criminal Discovery in Pennsylvania
JAMES T. RANNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION-PRETRIAL DISCOVERY GENERALLY
Pretrial discovery by the defendant in criminal cases in the fed-
eral courts and in most state courts, including those in Pennsyl-
vania, is considerably more limited than that allowed in civil cases.'
* B.S. University of Wisconsin, 1966; J.D. Harvard, 1969; Clerk to the
Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; Assist-
ant District Attorney, Deputy Chief, Appeals Division, Philadelphia, 1972-
73; Director of Legislation Unit, 1974.
1. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial (Approved Draft 1970)
[hereinafter cited as ABA DIscovERY STANDARDS]. The federal criminal dis-
covery rule, FED. R. CRiM. P. 16, is the product of periodic revisions, the
most recent of which was 1974, and provides a more detailed analysis of par-
ticular discovery problems than most state discovery rules. Rule 16 is per-
suasive authority in states like Pennsylvania in regard to the areas of dis-
covery not specifically covered by state law and when accepted as such
may have the effect of broadening the state rule. Rule 16, which is illus-
trative of the limitations placed on discovery in criminal cases, provides in
part:
Rule 16 Discovery and inspection.
(a) Disclosure of evidence by the government.
(1) Information subject to disclosure.
(A) Statement of defendant.-Upon request of a defendant
the government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by
the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or
control of the government . . . the substance of any oral statement
which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made
by the defendant whether before or after arrest in response to inter-
rogation by any person then known to the defendant to be a gov-
ernment agent; and recorded testimony of the defendant before a
grand jury which relates to the offense charged ...
(B) Defendant's prior record.-Upon request of the defend-
ant the government shall furnish to the defendant such copy of his
prior criminal record, if any, as is then available to the attorney
for the government.
(C) Documents and tangible objects.-Upon request of the
defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof
which are within the possession, custody or control of the govern-
ment, and which are material to the preparation of his defense or
are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.
(D) Reports of examinations and tests.-Upon request of a
defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, made in con-
nection with the particular case. . . .
(E) Government witnesses.-Upon request of the defendant
the government shall furnish to the defendant a written list of the
names and addresses of all government witnesses which the attor-
ney for the government intends to call in the presentation of the
case in chief together with any record of prior felony convictions
of any such witness which is within the knowledge of the attorney
for the government ...
(2) Information not subject to disclosure.-Except as provided
in paragraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subdivision (a) (1), this rule
does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memo-
randa, or other internal government documents made by the attor-
ney for the government or other government agents in connection
with the nvestigation or prosecution of the case, or of statenents
made by government witnesses or prospective government wit-
nesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
(6) Disclosure of evidence by the defendant.
(1) Information subject to disclosure.
(A) Documents and tangible objects.-Upon request of the
government, the defendant shall permit the government to inspect
and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs,
tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the
possession, custody, or control of the defendant and which the de-
fendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.
(B) Reports of examinations and tests.-Upon request of the
government, the defendant shall permit the government to inspect
and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made in connec-
tion with the particular case or copies thereof, within the possession
or control of the defendant, which the defendant intends to intro-
duce as evidence in chief at the trial or which were prepared by
a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial when the
results or reports relate to his testimony.
(C) Defense witnesses.-Upon request of the government, the
defendant shall furnish the government a list of the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses he intends to call in the presentation of the
case in chief ...
(2) Information not subject to disclosure.-Except as to sci-
entific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal de-
fense documents made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents
in connection with the investigation or defense of the case or of
statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense
witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to
the defendant, his agents or attorneys....
(3) Failure to call witness.-The fact that a witness' name is
on a list furnished under this rule shall not be grounds for comment
upon a failure to call a witness.
(c) Continuing duty to disclose.-If, prior to or during trial, a
party discovers additional evidence or material previously re-
quested or ordered, which is subject to discovery or inspection un-
der this rule, or the identity of an additional witness or witnesses,
he shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney or the court
of the existence of the additional material or witness.
(d) Regulation of discovery.
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A wide variety of reasons have been advanced for this limitation
in criminal matters. Although exhaustive discussion and analysis
of the various reasons is beyond the scope of this article, a limited
review of the more common arguments is essential to an under-
standing of the present rules.
Typical of the reasons given for why "'discovery' in the context
of criminal procedure has a much more limited scope than it does
with respect to civil proceedings,"' 2 are the following: (a) greater
discovery could result in perjury, the manufacturing of evidence
and intimidation of witnesses3 ; (b) prosecution of certain kinds of
cases, especially conspiracy cases and those involving large criminal
organfzations, would be hampered by greater discovery since under
an "open files" rule of discovery the prosecution might be deterred
from prosecuting some defendants for fear that current leads in
the investigation of other crimes would be exposed 4 ; (c) investi-
gators might make materials nondiscoverable by committing them
to memory or by other means5 ; and (d) unlike civil cases, where
(1) Protective orders.-Upon a sufficient showing the court
may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied,
restricted or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.
Upon request by a party the court shall permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written state-
ment to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an or-
der granting relief following such a showing, the entire text of the
party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of
the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event
of an appeal.
(2) Failure to comply with a request.-If at any time during
the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the
court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may
order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a con-
tinuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not dis-
closed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the
circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner
of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such
terms and conditions as are just.
(e) Alibi witnesses.-Discovery of alibi witnesses is governed
by Rule 12.1.
2. Lewis v. Lebanon Court of Common Pleas, 436 Pa. 296, 300, 260
A.2d 184, 187 (1969).
3. See United States v. Randolph, 456 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1972);
Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 566-67, 192 A.2d 894, 895-96 (1963);
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 484-85 (1968); Survey of D.C.
Bar Association, 33 F.R.D. 101, 119 (1963); Developments in the Law-Dis-
covery, 74 HARv. L. REV. 940, 1051-63 (1961).
4. Cf. State v. Oswald, 197 Kan. 251, 261-62, 417 P.2d 261, 270 (1966);
Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST. L.J. 865, 879, 888 (1968).
5. See People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 190, 404 P.2d 209, 216, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 729, 736 (1965) (discovery held properly denied where the "officers'
field notes had been transcribed into integrated reports, the original notes
and records were discarded, and tapes erased, in accordance with the rou-
tine practices of the department."); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma
Real or Apparent?, 49 CAL. L. REV. 56, 92-93 n.167 (1961). But see United
there is mutual discovery with the purpose of isolating issues and
expediting matters, broad discovery would unnecessarily create col-
lateral issues and cause grounds for delay during trial.6
The preceding arguments favoring the limitation of criminal
discovery are typically countered by the following rebuttals: (a)
the dangers of perjury, tampering with or intimidation of wit-
nesses, or premature disclosure of the details of on-going investiga-
tions are matters of concern in only a minority of the cases and
thus should be dealt with under the circumstances of particular
cases rather than serving as a barrier to discovery in all casesT;
(b) the accused does not have investigatory powers equal to the
prosecution and can rarely obtain any information from police per-
sonnel who investigated the crime"; (c) disclosures should be made
before trial so that defense counsel has adequate time to check out
prospective testimony or scientific reports9 ; (d) discovery promotes
judicial efficiency via shorter trials, more guilty pleas and fewel
post-conviction attacks.10
in- i,..,-,;..la prtra rlcn- ic ciwrnprl hu Riilp R11) nf
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rule follows
the general pattern of restriction of criminal discovery exemplified
by the arguments favoring limitation noted above. It provides
that:
All applications of a defendant for pretrial discovery
and inspection shall be made not less than five days prior
to the scheduled date of trial. The court may order the
attorney for the Commonwealth to permit the defendant
or his attorney, and such persons as are necessary to assist
him, to inspect and copy or photograph any written confes-
sions and written statements made by the defendant. No
other discovery or inspection shall be ordered except upon
proof by the defendant, after hearing, of exceptional cir-
cumstances and compelling reasons. The order shall spec-
ify the time, place and manner of making discovery or in-
spection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as
are necessary and proper. In no event, however, shall the
court order pretrail discovery or inspection of written
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), also reported at, 448 F.2d
1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (possible sanctions for loss of evidence favorable to
the accused).
6. Commonwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 46-50, 195 A.2d 174,
175-77 (1963).
7. See ABA DIscoVERY STANDARDS at 2-3, 57-58; Brennan, The Crim-
inal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q.
279, 292-95 (1963); CIPES, CRIMINAL DEPENSE TECHNIQUES 11-13 (1969).
8. See generally Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event
or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 285-87 (1963); Goldstein, The State
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149 (1960); Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery,
33 F.R.D. 82, 83-88 (1963); AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL §§ 265-76 (2d ed.
1971).
9. See ABA DIscovERY STANDARDS at 58.
10. See ABA DiscovERY STANDARDS at 2, 58.
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statements of witnesses in the possession of the Common-
wealth."
Thus, under Rule 310: (1) the court has discretion to refuse
to order disclosure of even the defendant's own written statement
prior to trial; 12 (2) there is no right prior to trial to discovery of
a defendant's oral statements absent "exceptional circumstances";'"
(3) there is no right to pretrial discovery of statements of witnesses,
not even in the court's discretion; 14 (4) no other pretrial discovery
is permissible absent "exceptional circumstances and compelling
reasons." 15
11. PA. R. CRim. P. 310 (emphasis added); see PA. R. CRIM. P. 221, re-
garding bills of particulars, which adds nothing of substance to Rule 310,
but merely provides that the court may grant such part of a request for
a bill of particulars "as it deems necessary in the interests of justice." See
also CIPES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES § 10.03 (1969); HALL, KArIVsAR,
LAFAVE, AND ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1009-1011 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as HALL AND KAxMISAR]; BAILEY AND ROTHBLATT, HANDLING NAR-
COTIC AND DRUG CASES §§ 32-33 (1972); FED. R. CIM. P. 7(f); cf. HEALY AND
MANAK, THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 99-102 (1971) (discusses other pro-
cedural contexts for discovery).
12. Commonwealth v. Nardi, 430 Pa. 88, 91-92, 242 A.2d 248, 250 (1968).
13. Commonwealth v. Turra, 442 Pa. 192, 275 A.2d 96 (1971); see
United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 411-12 n.12 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 837. Contra, ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (ii) (rec-
ommends discovery of "the substance" of defendant's oral statements).
14. Commonwealth v. Kontos, 442 Pa. 343, 275 A.2d 89 (1971); Com-
monwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 566-67, 192 A.2d 894, 895-96 (1963); cf.
United States v. Randolph, 456 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1972) (held that denial
of pretrial discovery of a co-felon's statement was not violative of due proc-
ess); United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974) (semble). But
see ABA DIsCOVERY STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (i) (subject to a privilege for "work
product" and the possibility of various protective orders, the Standards rec-
ommend mandatory disclosure of the names and addresses of prospective
witnesses and their "relevant written or recorded statements"). As to the
discovery of the prosecutor's "work product" or "official secrets," see ABA
DISCOVERY STANDARDS § 2.6 (not discoverable). Statements of grand jury
witnesses are nondiscoverable pretrial under PA. R. CRIM. P. 310.
15. Commonwealth v. Senk, 412 Pa. 184, 193, 194 A.2d 221, 226 (1963)
(names and addresses of prosecution witnesses denied where exceptional
circumstances not present); DiJoseph Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187
(1958) (photographs of fingerprints nondiscoverable pretrial); Common-
wealth v. Jackson, 224 Pa. Super. 280, 303 A.2d 519 (1973) (names and ad-
dresses of prosecution witnesses held not discoverable under PENNSYLVANIA
RULES Or CRIMINAL PROCEDURE as then constituted); Commonwealth v. Fos-
ter, 219 Pa. Super. 127, 133, 280 A.2d 602, 604-05 (1971) (jury investigation
report used by the prosecution for jury selection not discoverable); Com-
monwealth v. Wisneski, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 165 (Phila. 1968) (refused disclo-
sure of Fire Marshall's investigation reports). But cf. Lewis v. Lebanon
Court of Common Pleas, 436 Pa. 296, 303, 260 A.2d 184, 188-89 (1969) ("in
the absence of an affirmative and convincing showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances or compelling reasons, a district attorney may not interfere with
the pretrial interrogation by a defense counsel of persons who may be called
upon as witnesses in the case."); 3 JONES ON EVIDENCE 557-58 (6th ed.
The preceding limitations on the defendant's ability to utilize
discovery, however, are subject to the constitutional duty upon the
prosecution to disclose any evidence which is "favorable" to the de-
fendant in time for his or her attorney to make use of this informa-
tion, which time may or may not be prior to trial."' Moreover,
even though discovery of certain matters may not be mandatory
at the pretrial stage but only after a witness has testified, 17 it may
nevertheless be to the benefit of both parties to have voluntary
pretrial disclosure to avoid delaying the trial, assuming no danger
of witness intimidation or tampering appears to exist.'" Finally,
it should be noted that many courts appear to be moving in the
direction of more liberal discovery, for both the defense and the
prosecution, and it is not unlikely that Pennsylvania will soon adopt
new discovery rules modeled upon the ABA Standards. 9
II. DIScOVERY OF INFORMANT'S IDENTITY
(a) PTetrial. In MylcCray v. IllinoiS2 0 the United States Supreme
Court held that the state is not constitutionally required to furnish
an accused with an informer's identity at a typical pretrial suppres-
sion hearing because the governmental interest in protecting in-
formers as a vital source of information outweighs the defendant's
interest in probing their veracity at this preliminary stage of the
proceedings. 2' The Court did not, however, preclude the possibility
1972) (same); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TnE PROSECUTION AND THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION § 3.1(c) (Approved Draft 1971) (same); ABA DIscOvERY
STANDARDS § 4.1 (same); see Commonwealth v. Jennings, 225 Pa. Super. 489,
311 A.2d 720 (1973) (semble). See also United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d
504 (6th Cir. 1974) (merely advising witness of right not to be interviewed
proper); United States v. Richter, 484 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973) (although
Rule 16 does not deal with the divulgence of names of prospective wit-
nesses, a trial court has the discretion to order their production possibly
with a protective order); People v. Aldridge, 47 Mich. App. 637, 209 N.W.2d
796 (1973) (held that subject to a "work product" exception for the
"thought processes" of the prosecutor, fairness dictates reciprocal discovery
of any dossiers on jurors); ABA DIscoVERY STANDARDS §§ 21(a) (i), (iv)-
(vi) (recommends discovery of: names and addresses of prospective wit-
nesses subject to certain conditions; any rerorts of experts whether or not
to be introduced; any documents which will be introduced; and prior crim-
inal records of prospective witnesses).
16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963): "We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or to
punishment...." See also HALL AND KAMISAR at 1065. See notes 41-53
and accompanying text infra.
17. Cf. note 58 and accompanying text infra.
18. Cf. United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974).
19. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often looked to the ABA
STANDARDS for guidance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185,
299 A.2d 264 (1973). The ABA DIscovERY STANDARDS have the distinct ad-
vantage of having employed an item-by-item analysis of the problems of
discovery, thus stripping away many of the more heated arguments as to
the proper scope of criminal discovery.
20. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
21. Id. at 307.
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that such disclosure might not be permissible under "extraordinary
circumstances" as the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence contem-
plate.
22
(b) At Trial. In the seminal case of Rovario v. United States,
2 3
the United States Supreme Court set forth a rather involved "bal-
ancing" test for determining when an informant's identity must be
disclosed at trial:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure
is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing
the public interest in protecting the flow of information
against the individual's right to prepare his defense.
Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous
must depend on the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible
defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testi-
mony, and other relevant factors.
24
The defendant in Rovario was charged with sale and transportation
of narcotics, the sale allegedly having been made to one "John Doe"
whose real name was withheld. The Court refused to adopt an
absolute rule requiring disclosure of the informant's identity in
every case even under its "supervisory power," but did nevertheless
reverse the conviction under its supervisory power on the special
facts before it since the informant: (1) might have disclosed evi-
dence of an entrapment; (2) might have thrown doubt on defend-
ant's identity or the identity of the package allegedly containing
the narcotics; (3) might have disclosed the defendant's lack of
knowledge of the contents of the package; (4) was the sole partici-
pant, other than the defendant, in the alleged sale (the case being
proven by one officer who overheard an incriminating conversation
between the defendant and the informant while hidden in the trunk
of a car and by a second officer who witnessed the sale from 100
22. Rule 510(c) (3) of the proposed FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE pro-
vides for in camera disclosure in extraordinary cases. See Commonwealth
v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 409-11, 312 A.2d 434, 439 (1973) (holding
that it was proper for motion judge to order disclosure in advance of trial;
that such an order was within the purview of PA. R. CasM. P. 310; and that
a motion judge's conclusion that "disclosure of an informant's identity is
necessary and essential to a fair trial" is tantamount to a finding that there
are "exceptional circumstances and compelling reasons" within Rule 310).
See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973) (held that
under certain circumstances a pretrial suppression hearing judge could re-
quire disclosure of the names of an informant's prior arrestees to test the
affiant's veracity); ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS § 3.6(b) ("only the most
compelling circumstances should require pretrial disclosure of the inform-
er's identity.").
23. 353 U.S. 54 (1957).
24. Id. at 62.
feet away); and (5) according to a government witness, denied
knowing the defendant when confronted with him at the police sta-
tion. Although the facts of Roviaro were peculiarly appropriate
for a reversal, the case-by-case analysis employed by the Court has
left much uncertainty in this area in other situations.
Roviaro was followed in Pennsylvania by Commonwealth v.
Carter.25 Carter applied Roviaro to a case where there was no
claim of entrapment and one other witness both saw and heard
all of the drug sale transaction, but that witness was a police officer
and saw only one sale a long time prior to the defendant's arrest.
The Court suggested that it probably would not have held as it
did if there were other "neutral" witnesses to the sale. 26 Contrary
results have been obtained in cases like Rugendorf v. United
States,2 7 where there was no indication that the informer "played
a direct and prominent part, as the sole participant with the ac-
cused, in the very offense for which the latter was convicted.
28
It has been suggested that in most cases an in camera hearing may
be a helpful way to determine whether an informer's identity
should be disclosed at trial.2 9 Finally, it should be noted that even
if disclosure of an informant's identity is ordered under Roviaro,
the prosecution retains the option of refusing to disclose the inform-
ant's identity and accepting dismissal of its case where a particular
informant's continued anonymity is more important for law en-
forcement purposes than the conviction of one defendant.30
III. DISCOVERY BY THE PROSECUTION
In the landmark decision of Jones v. Superior Court of Nevada
County,3 1 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court shocked
25. 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967).
26. Id. at 61-62, 233 A.2d at 288.
27. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
28. Id. at 534. See McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.
1973); United States v. Cantor, 470 F.2d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (defendant has a "heavy
burden" to show that the identity of an informant is necessary to his de-
fense); State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1972) ("If a bare sug-
gestion that the informer framed the defendant could effect a disclosure of
the informer's name, then the enforcement of our narcotics laws would be
jeopardized"); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa. Super. 401, 405, 312 A.2d
434, 437 (1973) (immediate presence of the informer is not a sine qua non
for disclosure); Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 268, 293 A.2d 33, 38-
39 (1972) (Roviaro distinguished where there were two eyewitnesses aside
from the informer, the latter's observations, if any, being deemed "not cru-
cial to the identification"); NEDRUD'S CRIMINAL LAW REPORTER ATest § 4.5
(1974); McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § II (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); Rule 510(c) (2), proposed FED. R. Ev.; 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL Evi-
DENCE § 580 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972); ABA DIscovERY STANDARDS § 2.6(b);
Annot., 8 A.L.R. FED. 6.
29. United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1973).
30. See MCCORMICK, McCoRMvcx ON EVIDENCE § 111, at 238 n.52 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972).
31. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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those accustomed to his liberal pronouncements by holding that
there was no constitutional impediment to a pretrial discovery or-
der requiring a defendant to disclose the names and addresses of
witnesses he intended to call and certain x-rays and reports he in-
tended to produce in support of a claim of impotence.3 2 Justice
Traynor reasoned that such discovery by the prosecution did not
violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because
the identity of the witnesses and the contents of any reports which
the defendant intends to introduce will necessarily be revealed
eventually at trial. Thus, the discovery order simply required dis-
closure of information the defendant would shortly reveal in any
event.3 3 The decision is also premised, however, upon the liberal
pretrial discovery allowed the defense in California.
34
The Jones case has been the subject of much commentary but
precious little case law,35 none of it in Pennsylvania. Although
many possible constitutional problems remain unresolved in the
area of discovery by the prosecution, especially in regard to rules
requiring pretrial disclosure by the accused of the nature of his
defense, 36 it has long been the rule in at least the federal courts
37
that where the defense has obtained discovery of prosecution re-
ports or other documents, the trial court may grant reciprocal dis-
covery rights to the prosecution as to those items which the defense
intends to present at trial. In fact, in 1974, Rule 16(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure went even further, eliminating
the conditional nature of the right and broadening the subjects dis-
coverable to include defense witnesses:
[U]pon request of the government, the defendant shall
32. 372 P.2d at 922.
33. Id. See also Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Dis-
covery, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 247 (1964).
34. This premise would seem to be a prerequisite for this kind of dis-
covery after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wardius v. Ore-
gon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973), which held that "alibi notice" rules (which pre-
clude alibi witnesses other than the defendant from testifying unless notice
of intent to use the witnesses is given several days before trial) violate the
due process clause unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal
defendant. See also AMSTERDAM TRIAL MANUAL § 274.
35. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 255-56 (1969).
36. See generally Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); ABA Dis-
covERy STANDArDS § 3.3; HALL AND KAMISAR at 1051 and at 357 (Supp. 1973);
AMSTERDAM TRIAL MANUAL § 274 at 253; WRIcHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDuRE § 256 (1969). One thing that would seem clear is that where a de-
fendant has a constitutional right to discovery, his right to discovery cannot
be conditioned upon reciprocal disclosure. In other cases, however, no con-
stitutional objection to reciprocity would be likely to prevail. See WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 256 at 527-28 (1969).
37. Cf. Rule 16(b), FED. R. CRiM. P. (discussed in text at note 38 in-
Ira); cf. ABA DIscOVERY STANDARDS § 3.2.
permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or
copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession,
custody or control of the defendant and which the defend-
ant intends to introduce as evidence in chief at the
trial . ..
[T]he defendant shall permit the government to inspect
and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical
or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experi-
ments made in connection with the particular case, or
copies thereof, within the possession or control of the de-
fendant....
[T] he defendant shall furnish the government a list of the
names and addresses of the witnesses he intends to call
38
Although no analogous provision exists in Pennsylvania, there
would seem to be no reason why this form of discovery would not
be permissible. 39
Finally, it is also well settled that the prosecution is entitled,
subject to certain constitutional limitations, to "discovery" of the
person of the accused in the form of his appearance in a lineup,
his fingerprints, his clothing, his handwriting, his voice, and various
other reasonably limited intrusions into his body such as hair or
blood samples.
40
IV. DUTY OF THE PROSECUTION TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE
"FAVORABLE" TO THE ACCUSED
Beginning with a line of cases holding that the prosecutor has
a duty to correct perjured testimony which he knows to be per-
jured,41 the United States Supreme Court has stated that the prose-
cution has a constitutional duty to disclose evidence which is "fav-
orable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punish-
ment. '42 As one might suspect, there has been no small amount
of controversy about the meaning of the terms "favorable" and
"material."43
38. See note 1 supra for the additional text of FED. R. Cim. P. 16. See
generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE for a full discussion of
this rule. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) regarding use of the subpoena
duces tecum.
39. Compare N.J. R. CRni. P. 3.5-11(d) with FLA. R. CPiM. P. 1.220(c)
(3); Cf. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 256.
40. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail scrap-
ings); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 433 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Searles, 450 Pa. 384, 302 A.2d 335 (1973) (handwriting samples); Com-
monwealth v. Ellis, 445 Pa. 307, 284 A.2d 735 (1971) (fingerprinting); Com-
monwealth v. Marino, 435 Pa. 245, 255 A.2d 911 (1969) (voice identifica-
tion). See also ABA DIscOVERY STANDARDS § 3.1.
41. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103 (1935); see also Giles v. Maryland, 385 U.S. 66 (1967).
42. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786, 794 (1972).
43. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (an involved case fac-
tually which must be read to be believed, the Court interpreting the word
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Although there is a suggestion in a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court 44 that a request by the defense for produc-
tion is required before the constitutional duty of disclosure is im-
posed, certainly the better rule is that a failure to so request is
irrelevant or at the very least not conclusive. 45 The chief problem
with the Brady-Moore rule46 as so conceived, however, is that of
enforcement. The not entirely satisfactory answer that has been
adopted by almost all courts is to hold that Brady does not mandate
an automatic in camera inspection of the prosecution's file by the
court; all that is generally required is that the prosecutor state for
the record whether he has anything in his file favorable to the de-
fendant.
47
That an in camera inspection is not generally required is well
illustrated by the following statement of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Harris:48
[B] rady . . . is inapplicable. The United States Attorney
has categorically stated that he knows of no information
material in such a way that only very serious exculpatory evidence must
be disclosed); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (involved the state-
ment of a co-conspirator that he, rather than the defendant, did the actual
killing); United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 498-99 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1971); United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 911 (6th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Romero v. McMann, 418 F.2d 860, 865 (2d Cir. 1969);
United States ex rel. Felton v. Rundle, 410 F.2d 1300, 1304 (3d Cir. 1969)
("Nor were the discrepancies between the police report and the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses of such a nature that the failure of the prosecu-
tion to give the report to the defense was per se a denial of due process
regardless of other circumstances"); United States v. Harris, 409 F.2d 77,
80-81 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622
(3d Cir. 1963) (suppression of "extremely important" statement of chief
prosecution witness which could have resulted in conviction for a lesser de-
gree of murder held violative of due process); Commonwealth v. Dober-
stein, 223 Pa. Super. 554, 302 A.2d 513 (1973); HALL AND KAMISAR at 1060-
65; Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 16, 30, 124-30 (1970); ABA DISCOVERY STANDARDS §
2.1(c) at 53, 73-78; and 1 PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL GUME § 1.17 at 32 nn.6, 7
(Feldman rev. 1973).
44. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972).
45. United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 459 (9th Cir. 1972) ("due
process can be denied by failure to disclose alone").
46. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) combine to set out the requirement of disclosure of "favor-
able evidence."
47. United States v. Newman, 476 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973) (on the rec-
ord denial by the prosecution of any deal with prosecution witness held suf-
ficient to preclude further inquiry); United States v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[W]e do not
believe that appellant's mere speculation about materials in the govern-
ment's files requires the district court or this court under Brady to make
materials available for their inspection. The possibilities for abuse in such
a procedure are manifest.").
48. 409 F.2d 77 (4th Cir. 1969).
that could -aid the defendants, and counsel for the appel-
lants do not charge in their briefs that favorable evidence
was suppressed. We have previously held that Brady does
not require the trial court to make an in camera search




However, in an extraordinary case the court has the discretion to
make an in camera inspection.50
It should be further noted that the constitutional obligation
upon the prosecution to disclose "favorable" evidence to the accused
extends to disclosure of any deals made with a prosecution wit-
ness. 51 Disclosure of a prosecution witness' criminal record has also
been held to fall within the Brady-Moore rule. 2 However, a vio-
lation of the Brady rule can be harmless error. 53
V. DEFENSE DISCOVERY AT TRIAL
Although the Pennsylvania cases dealing with discovery at the
time of trial are at times a bit confused as to the precise basis for
their holdings, 54 each case nevertheless fits within the framework
49. Id. at 80-81.
50. Commonwealth v. Swierczeski, 215 Pa. Super. 130, 135, 257 A.2d
336, 339 (1969). See HALL AND KAMISAR at 1065.
51. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (witness testified that
no deals had been made, which was not true, this being unknown to the
prosecuting attorney who tried the case; held violation of due process);
United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1972) (nondisclosure re-
versible error even though defense counsel never asked about any plea bar-
gain since the trial under all the circumstances was "unacceptably unfair");
United States v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) (same as Harris);
People v. Nettles, 199 N.W.2d 845 (Mich. App. 1972); Commonwealth v.
Kurtz, 219 Pa. Super. 1, 280 A.2d 410 (1971) (same as Giglio). But cf.
United States ex rel. Dale v. Williams, 459 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1972) ("To
vitiate the finding of guilt under the Giglio-Napue rule, it must be demon-
strated that the testimony had the force of a reasonable likelihood to affect
the judgment of the fact finder"); United States v. Murray, 445 F.2d 1171
(3d Cir. 1971) (refusal to permit defendant to cross-examine two key gov-
ernment witnesses on whether their testimony was given in return for cer-
tain government promises held not reversible error where such testimony
would have been cumulative); Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Pa. 327, 331,
301 A.2d 867, 870 (1973) ("We will not apply Giglio on the strength of ap-
pellant's unsupported allegation that the Commonwealth and these wit-
nesses had struck a pretestimonial 'deal,' especially since appellant, during
trial, neglected to probe the possibility of an agreement.").
52. United States v. Gibson, 12 Crim. L. Rptr. 2096 (D.C. Super. 1972).
See also ABA DiscovERY STANDARDS § 2.1 (a) (vi) (such discovery recom-
mended). But cf, Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 812, 518 P.2d 1353,
112 Cal. Rptr. 257. (1974) (production not required for witnesses "who will
testify to facts about which it appears there will be no dispute or which
have only minimum significance in the case").
53. Compare United States v. Donatelli, 484 F.2d 305 (1st Cir. 1973);
Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1968); and Coleman v. Maxwell, 275
F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (harmless error found) with United States
v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. '972).
54. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 417 Pa. 321, 208 A.2d 219 (1965) (The
prosecution sought to suppress a statement made to the FBI by the main
eyewitness that she did not see the beginning of a fight, whereas she testi-
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of the federal "Jencks Act," 55 the lodestar in this area. The Jencks
fied at trial that defendant struck the first blow. Two members of the
Court, concurring in part and "dissenting" in part [actually, although re-
ported as a dissent, this was a plurality of the justices], refused to reverse
on constitutional grounds and stated that the case should be remanded to
the trial court "in the interests of justice" to determine whether the state-
ment was "relevant and admissible;" one justice dissented on the ground
that the defendant's demand had not been sufficiently specific; and one jus-
tice did not participate). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 444 Pa. 364,
366, 281 A.2d 851 (1971) (held that defendant should have been allowed
to examine "at trial, for purposes of cross-examination, certain verbatim
notes" of a statement by the victim, the victim testifying that the officer
"took down every word I said"); Commonwealth v. Kontos, 442 Pa. 343,
347, 276 A.2d 830 (1971) (required "disclosure at trial of the prior state-
ments of Commonwealth witnesses"); Commonwealth v. Collins, 440 Pa.
368, 373, 269 A.2d 882, 885 (1970) (held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to order discovery of the "scribbled notes" made by an assistant
district attorney in interviewing a prosecution witness, citing Campbell v.
United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961), a case interpreting the Jencks Act); Com-
monwealth v. Joinlett, 217 Pa. Super. 406, 407-10, 271 A.2d 886, 887-88 (1970)
(dicta that a report written by the officer who testified should have been
discoverable for impeachment); Commonwealth v. Swierczewski, 215 Pa.
Super. 130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969) (the report involved was written by the
officer who testified); Commonwealth v. Kubacki, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 532,
224 A.2d 80, 85 (1966) (involved a transcript "made from a tape recording
which had been made by that witness on his own recording device"); and
Commonwealth v. Fromal, 202 Pa. Super. 45, 195 A.2d 174 (1963) (upheld
denial of discovery of a police file prepared by the testifying officer which
apparently contained much "work product").
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). The Act provides in part:
§ 3500. Demands for production of statements and reports of wit-
nesses
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States,
no statement or report in the possession of the United States which
was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of sub-
poena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified
on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant,
order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter
defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which
relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.
If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to
be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to
be produced under this section contains matter which does not re-
late to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court
shall order the United States to deliver such statement for the in-
spection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court shall
excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the
subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material
excised, the court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the
defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion
of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defend-
ant objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an ad-
judication of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such
statement shall be preserved by the United States and, in the event
the defendant appeals, shall be made available to the appellate
Act adopts the essence of the holding in Jencks v. United States,56
wherein the United States Supreme Court, as an exercise of its "su-
pervisory power," held that a defendant should be entitled to in-
spect reports of investigators to their superiors regarding matters
about which they testified.
The Act, the constitutionality of which has been repeatedly pro-
claimed,57 provides that a defendant is entitled to inspect the report
of a statement of a prosecution witness for cross-examination pur-
poses (a) after the witness has testified58 and (b) where it is shown
or undisputed that the report is an accurate transcription which
is a "substantially verbatim" recital of an oral statement or was
signed or adopted by the witness59 and (c) the statement "relates
to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified."60
court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling
of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a de-
fendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon ap-
plication of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for
such time as it may determine to be reasonably required for the
examination of such statement by said defendant and his prepara-
tion for its use in the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of
the court under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the de-
fendant any such statement, or such portion thereof as the court
may direct, the court shall strike from the record the testimony of
the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its dis-
cretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a
mistrial be declared.
56. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
57. United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969) ("Indeed our
Jencks decisions and the Jencks Act were not cast in constitutional terms.
... They state rules of evidence governing trials before federal tribunals;
and we have never extended their principles to state criminal trials.");
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 257-58 (1961); Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) ("The statute as interpreted does not
reach any constitutional barrier"). See also Cicenia v. Legay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958) (denial of pretrial inspection of even defendant's confession held no
violation of due process); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941)
(held that denial of pretrial discovery of the notes and memoranda of cer-
tain government witnesses was constitutionally permissible); United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 231-34 (1940) (held that where a
grand jury transcript was used by the government to refresh the recollec-
tion of its witnesses, it was constitutionally permissible to preclude its use
by the defendant); United States ex rel. Durso v. Pate, 426 F.2d 1083, 1089-
90 (7th Cir. 1970) (failure to produce police report for use in impeachment
not violative of due process where the report did not indicate whether the
descriptions of the suspects were based upon statements of the witness
sought to be impeached or upon statements of other persons or on some
composite).
58. Cf. Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973). But cf.
ABA DrscovERY STAIARDS § 2.1 (a) (i).
59. See notes 61-63 infra.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), (c) (1970). This requirement operates as an
automatic "work product" exception. See also Commonwealth v. Fromal,
202 Pa. Super. 45, 195 A.2d 174 (1963) and ABA DiscovFRy STANDARDS at
.77:
There may be found in prosecution files miscellaneous pre-arrest
memoranda indicating tentative hypotheses and imaginative specu-
lations about who committed a given offense and how. In the
hands of defense counsel, these might form a basis for cross-exami-
nation and argument totally unrelated to the offense in issue or evi-
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The key question of interpretation of the Jencks Act is the
meaning of the word "statement" which is defined by the Act in
subsection (e) to mean:
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other record-
ing, or a transcription thereof, which is substantially a ver-
batim recital of an oral statement made by said witness
and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such
oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcrip-
tion thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
In the leading case of Palermo v. United States,61 the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, held
that "summaries of an oral statement which evidence substantial
selection of material, or which were prepared after the interview
without the aid of complete notes, and hence rest on the memory
of the agent, are not to be produced." 2 The Court stated that:
One of the most important motive forces behind the enact-
ment of this legislation was the fear that an expansive
reading of Jencks would compel the undiscriminating pro-
duction of agent's summaries of interviews regardless of
their character or completeness. Not only was it strongly
feared that disclosure of memoranda containing the investi-
gative agent's interpretations and impressions might reveal
the inner workings of the investigative process and thereby
injure the national interest, but it was felt to be grossly
unfair to allow the defense to use statements to impeach
a witness which could not fairly be said to -be the witness'
own rather than the product of the investigator's selections,
interpretations, and interpolations. The committee reports
of both Houses and the floor debates clearly manifest the
intention to avoid these dangers by restricting production
to those statements specifically defined in the bill.63
dence bearing thereon; the 'smoke screen' thus laid would be all
the more damaging because it would be based on source material
originating with or accumulated by law enforcement personnel.
61. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
62. Id. at 352-53.
63. Id. at 350. A similar discussion of policy considerations may be
found in Commonwealth v. Fromal, supra note 60. See also Campbell v.
United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963) (agent's longhand notes of interview
complete with respect to pertinent information and affirmed as accurate by
the witness after recitation by the agent held discoverable under the Jencks
Act); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 353-55 (1969) (mere "rough
notes" nondiscoverable); United States v. Roberts, 455 F.2d 930, 931 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1050 (1973) (report of interview with wit-
ness which did not directly quote the witness and was not signed by him
not discoverable); United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311, 316-18 (10th Cir.
The ABA Discovery Standards opt for a broader definition of
"statements" than the Jencks Act, the comments stating only that
"the minimum standard is not stated in terms of what is 'verbatim'
or 'substantially verbatim,' leaving it to the various jurisdictions
to work out their own solution consistent with overriding purposes
for granting broad pretrial discovery to the accused. '64 Finally in
this regard, in 1970 the Jencks Act definition of "statement" was
amended to include grand jury testimony of a prosecution witness.65
The Jencks Act's technique of in camera disclosure has been
advocated in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Swierczewski.66
There, a request was made for access to a portion of a report con-
taining prior statements relating to search and arrest. The court,
in considering this request, held:
[D] efense access is subject to the control of the trial court,
which must review the requested documents and may per-
mit access only to those portions relevant to matters raised
in direct examination. This procedure permits judicial con-
sideration of the Commonwealth's interest in protecting
confidential information.
T
The Jencks Act rationale has been extended to apply to discov-
ery during trial of lab reports on the defendant's clothing "once
the Commonwealth initiates a general inquiry concerning an ac-
cused's clothing."68 It should be noted that, like the Brady-Moore
rule,69 a Jencks rule violation may be harmless error.70 Further-
1973) (notes of U.S. Attorney "occasionally" read back to witness held non-
discoverable); State v. Cannon, 465 S.W.2d 584 (Mo. 1971) (police report
which contained only a composite description by several witnesses not dis-
coverable); Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 252 (1969).
64. ABA DiscovERY STANDARDS at 63.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1970). Under prior law, a "particularized
need" had to be shown to require disclosure. Cf. Dennis v. United States,
384 U.S. 855 (1966); MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 113 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972); and HALL AND KAMISAR at 826-38. Pretrial disclosure is
prohibited absent a showing of a "substantial likelihood of gross or preju-
dicial irregularities in the conduct of the grand jury" which would warrant
dismissal of the indictment; see United States v. Budzanoski, 462 F.2d 443,
454 (3d Cir. 1972). See also FED. R. CrmM. P. 16(a) (3).
66. 215 Pa. Super. 130, 257 A.2d 336 (1969).
67. Id. at 135, 257 A.2d at 339 (1969). See also Commonwealth v. Ku-
backi, 208 Pa. Super. 523, 224 A.2d 80 (1966); Commonwealth v. Smith, 412
Pa. 1, 192 A.2d 671, cert. granted, 376 U.S. 354, on remand, 417 Pa. 321, 208
A.2d 219 (1965); Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894
(1963); ABA DiscovnaY STANDARDS § 4.6.
68. Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 261, 299 A.2d 590, 595
(1973) (harmless error found). See also Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968) (photographs shown to eyewitness but not incorporated
into written statement not discoverable under the Act).
69. See note 46 supra.
70. Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590 (1973). See
Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367 (1959); United States v. Smaldone,
484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117, 1119-
20 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Saitta, 443 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1972); Matthews v. United States, 407 F.2d 1371,
1376 (6th Cir. 1969) ("It is not fatal error to fail to produce a statement
that is corroborative of a witness' testimony").
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more, the fact that production may not be required under the
Jencks Act or its state case law equivalents does not preclude the
possibility that discovery will be mandated under Brady-Moore.
71
VI. CONCLUSION
Most states, including Pennsylvania, would do well to recon-
sider their criminal discovery provisions. Both the federal discov-
ery rule and the ABA discovery standards would provide excellent
substantive guidelines in such considerations. Procedurally, the
recommendations of the ABA standards for the use of various pre-
trial conferences and hearings to explore discovery and other pre-
liminary issues72 should be seriously considered.
71. See notes 42-52 and accompanying text supra (constitutional duty
to disclose evidence "favorable" to the accused).
72. ABA DiscovERY STANDARDS §§ 5.1-5.4. These standards provide for
pretrial conferences concerning plea discussions, appointment of counsel
and related assistance, suppression matters, motions to quash, possible stip-
ulations, severance questions and conduct of voir dire.
